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"Propaganda Must Be Painless": 
Radio Entertainment and 
Government Propaganda During 
World War II 
GERD HORTEN 
I. INTRODUCTION 
FOR A JITTERY RADIO INDUSTRY concerned about the future of American broadcasting in the early months after America's entry into World 
War II, William B. Lewis came as a godsend. 1 As head of the Domestic 
Radio Division of the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF), and later the 
Office of War Information (OWI, June 1942), Lewis, a former vice­
president of CBS, reassured the industry that the commercial structure of 
American radio would remain unchanged. In his first meeting with net­
work executives and radio sponsors and advertisers in January 1942, he 
outlined his pragmatic approach to radio's war effort. As he argued, "ra­
dio is valuable only because of the enormous audiences it has created." 
During wartime, his government office planned to use radio's popularity 
without unnecessarily disrupting radio structure and schedule: "Let's not 
forget that radio is primarily an entertainment medium, and must con­
tinue to be if it is ... to deliver the large audiences we want to reach."2 
Lewis was very successful in pushing through his pragmatic approach 
for radio's war effort. He was instrumental in filling the Radio Division of 
the OWI with men and women from radio stations, the networks, and 
advertising agencies - "dollar-a-year men,'' as they were referred to at the 
time. Lewis was a charismatic, well-liked person and quickly developed a 
reputation for getting things done. By January 1943, he was promoted to 
assistant director of the Domestic Branch. He was one of the main archi­
tects who developed a distinctly "Madison Avenue" style ofwartime propa­
ganda against the opposition of writers and intellectuals employed by the 
OWI, who favored an informational propaganda approach. By early 1943, 
the latter resigned from government service, leaving it to media represen­
tatives and advertisers to sell the war to the American people. s 
In the case of radio, Lewis's office, in collaboration with the radio 
industry, developed a simple yet effective plan for radio's participation in 
the war. According to this Network Allocation Plan, as it became known, 
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radio programs would integrate war messages on a rotating schedule. The 
basic idea was to superimpose radio's war effort on the existing radio 
schedule in order to minimize disruptions of Americans' listening habits 
and to maximize the effect of war messages. The plan followed a simple 
premise shared by Lewis and radio representatives alike: "Radio propa­
ganda must be painless." 
Radio's Network Allocation Plan became the master schedule for the 
government's war effort through broadcasting because it combined two 
crucial imperatives. First, it demonstrated that a free media could effec­
tively execute its war effort on a voluntary basis, adding credence to the 
conviction that democracy was a viable and preferable alternative to 
totalitarian Fascist regimes. Second, the plan least disrupted the estab­
lished broadcasting schedule and thus, at the same time, assured comfort­
able profit margins for the radio industry and secured radio sponsors' and 
advertisers' continued interest in the swift and effective execution of ra­
dio's war effort. 
To be sure, radio was only one of the media that disseminated the 
government propaganda campaigns during World War II. Films, news­
reels, magazines, and all other media participated in this propaganda 
effort. Historians have studied most of these cultural genres in connection 
with their contribution to wartime propaganda. In contrast, radio's role 
for the domestic government propaganda has so far been ignored.4 
This oversight is all the more surprising because radio was the pri­
mary medium during World War II in the United States: 110 million 
Americans, 90 percent of the population, listened to an average of four 
hours daily. 5 In late 1942, Lewis argued that radio's execution of the war 
effort made it the most pervasive and most persuasive propaganda instru­
ment in the country and, possibly, worldwide: 
As 1943 dawns, American radio - of the free will of all its com­
ponent parts - is coordinated to do a more effective job in the 
dissemination of war information than any other radio system 
in the world, or than any other medium of communication in 
this country.6 
In this essay, I argue with Lewis that American radio presented the 
most formidable propaganda medium in the country. I analyze radio's war 
effort through two of the most popular comedy programs of the 1940s: the 
Jack Benny Show and Fibber McGee and Molly. Radio comedy was the 
vanguard of radio's propaganda effort through entertainment. It was the 
most popular radio genre and thus reached the greatest number of Ameri­
cans on a regular basis. As I show, radio entertainment proved not only 
relaxing and distracting, as many contemporary observers frequently 
noted, but, more importantly, these comedy shows simultaneously in­
formed and inspired their listeners through a steady stream of well-dosed 
and well-orchestrated government propaganda campaigns. 
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II. RADIO COMEDY AND WARTIME PROPAGANDA 
FIBBER McGEE: I tell you it ain't fair, Molly, they can't do this 

to me - four gallons a week. Why, that's ridiculous. 

MOLLY: I think so, too. 

FIBBER: You do? 

MOLLY: Yes, you don't need four gallons! 

FIBBER: Doggone it. I do too. Four gallons is outrageous. Where 

can I go on four gallons of gas? 

MOLLY: Where do you wanna go, dearie? 

FIBBER: Well ... Gee, whiz ... What if I did want to go some 

place? Even in an emergency or something ... 

MOLLY: You mean like running out of cigars?7 

On December 1, 1942, gas rationing went into effect nationwide. It 
was a Tuesday, and at 9 p.m. of the very same day, thirty million Ameri­
cans tuned in to their favorite comedy couple, Fibber McGee and Molly. 
Gas rationing had also come to the residents of 79 Wistful Vista of the 
fictional small town in the Midwest, and Fibber McGee loudly expressed 
his dislike of the new rationing measure: 
FIBBER: Ah, forget my cigars. I'm talking about this mileage 
rationing. I think it's a dirty deal. The whole thing is silly! It's 
going to make everybody stay at home. Why, in two years a guy 
from Indiana won't gonna know what a guy from Kansas is 
talking about. 
MOLLY: Where are you from? 
FIBBER: Illinois. 
MOLLY: Then it's happened already. I don't even know what 
you're talking about. 
FIBBER: I'm talking about giving all the car owners a measly 
medicine drop full of gasoline. It's an infringement on private 
rights, that's what it is! 
MOLLY: Look, dearie, look. The main reason they're rationing 
gasoline is to save tires. Don't you know if we keep driving like 
we have been a majority of automobiles will be off the road by 
next year? 
FIBBER: Good! There's too much traffic anyway! Too crowded. 
Get the cars off the road. That'll be fine. That's swell. 
MOLLY: Well, I'm glad you feel that way, because yours would 
be one of them. 
FIBBER: What?!! Me? Give up my car? Oh, no I don't. I paid for 
my tires and by the hind leg of Leon Henderson I got a right to 
drive it! 
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As Molly went on to explain, the director of the Office ofPrice Adminis­
tration COPA), Leon Henderson, had taken this step not because of a 
shortage of fuels. Instead, the OPA had decided that the only way to 
safeguard the precariously low rubber supply was to ration gasoline and 
thus curtail driving. Gas rationing had started on the East Coast in May 
1942. Over the summer and fall, the Roosevelt administration had, in 
addition, ordered a ban on pleasure driving and a thirty-five-mile speed 
limit on all of the nation's highways. 
In connection with its gas-rationing order, the government issued A, 
B, and C stickers. Holders of an A sticker received four gallons a week 
(later three). B card holders, like war workers, were given additional 
gasoline for essential driving. C stickers were issued only to people who 
needed their cars for work-related driving, for example, doctors. The 
cards were issued by the local rationing boards. What made gas rationing 
a contentious issue was that the respective stickers indicated a person's 
social status and standing in their communities. As another historian has 
pointedly put it: "Obviously, if you were an A card holder, you were a 
nobody - a nonessential who puttered about in his car on insignificant 
little errands while cars packed to the roof with joyriding war workers or 
large sedans driven by powerful men with mysterious connections blew 
carbon monoxide in your face."8 Nationwide gas rationing cemented Hen­
derson's reputation as the most unpopular man in America. 
[Enter MR. WILCOX; one of McGEE's neighbors] 
FIBBER: This mileage rationing has gotten me disgusted. 
MOLLY: You know, he's been raving about it all day, Mr. Wilcox. 
He thinks the OPA is trying to make an A-P-E out of him. 
FIBBER: And they are, too! A citizen of my standing, trying to 
get along on an A-A-A [stuttering] book. It's a lot of foolishness. 
I've got business to take care of. 
WILCOX: What business, pal? 
FIBBER: Well, in the first place, I'll ... Well, gee whiz. I've got 
responsibilities. 
MOLLY: Oh, he really has, Mr. Wilcox. 
FIBBER: [feebly] Yes. 
MOLLY: You know, he's the sole supporter of three pinochle 
players at the Elks Club. 
WILCOX: Fibber, you talk like a chump ... If you had the 
brains of a seahorse, you'd realize the spot this country's in 
regarding rubber. Why, England has no civilian driving and 
Canada has had mileage rationing for months. So has our east­
ern seaboard. 
FIBBER: What's that got to do with ... [interrupted] 
WrLcox: And you stand there and squawk putting your petty 
little private life against the importance of winning this war. 
FIBBER: I still don't get ... [interrupted] 
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WILCOX: Get wise. Only a monkey could expect to do business 
as usual. And we haven't got time for monkey business! [Exit 
WILCOX under loud applause.] 
FIBBER: You know, Molly, m-m-maybe I was wrong. 
MOLLY: Well, for goodness' sake, at last you've begun to real­
ize it. 
FIBBER: As he says, only a monkey could ... Hey! Was that guy 
calling me a monkey? What that - , just because I think I got a 
right to more than four gallons a week. A guy of my standing in 
the community.... 
[Fade into song by Kingsmen Quartet] 
Like much ofthe nation, Fibber McGee was visibly rattled over the new 
gas-rationing measure. By the early 1940s, Fibber, played by Jim Jordan, 
was a well-known and well-liked character, who presented an excellent foil 
for the disgruntled American citizen: Fibber was full of himself, he was a 
windbag and a braggart, and yet a likeable neighborhood nuisance. He was 
a man who conducted his friendly rivalries with his neighbors in the open; 
in fact, the name calling and utter disrespect for social etiquette was one of 
the show's distinctive features. Above all, however, Fibber was a bungler 
and an easy fall guy for his patient and loving wife, Molly (Marian Jordan), 
and the other frequently intruding friends and neighbors.9 
The show's writer, Don Quinn, usually left it to Fibber to bring up all 
the self-serving criticisms against government rationing measures ­
"They should have foreseen this," "What in the case of an emergency?" 
"It's an infringement of civil liberties" - only to have each of his charges 
deflated by the more respectable and socially responsible characters of 
the show. Yet Fibber echoed many of the sentiments of actual citizens, 
who were as dissatisfied about the measure as the radio comedian. Like 
Fibber, these citizens were told through subtle and often very direct 
means to lighten up and to put their petty little self-interest in perspec­
tive to the national interest and the war effort. 
Typically, Fibber was put in his spot through humorous repartees or 
quick stabs at his inflated ego. During wartime, however, these ex­
changes could include a serious note or even harsh reminders of the war 
that America was engaged in. One of the best examples was the parting 
scene of Mayor LaTrivia on the same gas-rationing show. Gale Gordon, 
the actor who played LaTrivia, had been drafted into the Coast Guard and 
was leaving the program; his farewell was included in the show of Decem­
ber 1. Mayor LaTrivia was a serious and respected administrator of the 
fictional small town, intelligent, but stiff in his social skills. In his usual 
exchanges with Fibber, LaTrivia was bogged down by Fibber's quick wit 
and often illogical and nonsensical wordplays and faux pas, forcing 
LaTrivia to long dramatic pauses and generally ended in him leaving the 
McGees residence befuddled. In his farewell show, however, it was 
LaTrivia who left Fibber dumbfounded: 
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LATRIVIA: Well, for heaven's sake, [McGee], stop your griping. 
You're lucky you've got a car at all. Well, excuse me, McGee, 
but when I get over to Africa or Australia or wherever they 
send me, I'll be thinking of you, McGee, and all the hardship 
you're suffering ... Goodbye, Mrs. McGee. I'll see you when 
this is over. 
MOLLY: Bye, Mr. Mayor, and happy landing. 
LATRIVIA: Thank you. Good-bye, McGee. 
FIBBER: Good-bye, Mr. Mayor. Don't take any wooden anchors. 
LATRIVIA: I won't. And, McGee, when you drive, if you get up to 
thirty-five miles an hour, think of somebody who didn't get a 
rubber lifeboat. Good-bye. 
[Exit LATRIVIA under loud applause.] 
During World War II, Don Quinn was one of the acknowledged masters 
of the integrated OWI propaganda messages. Quinn had been with Jim 
and Marian Jordan since their debut of the Fibber McGee and Molly Show 
in early 1935. By 1940, the program was one of the established top com­
edy broadcasts in the country, and its popularity led to a marked increase 
ofradio situation comedies. From 1942 to 1946, it alternated with the Bob 
Hope Show as the top-rated comedy program; each of them attracted an 
average weekly audience of thirty million Americans. 10 
When asked about the success of his "propaganda shows,'' Quinn ar­
gued that he was simply following established and successful rules for 
comedy writing. Listeners were already interested in these war-related 
topics, which made it easier for the writer: "We have better audience 
reaction, we get more fan mail, our Crossley [listener rating] goes up." In 
fact, to test the effectiveness of popular radio shows, the OWI agreed to 
give the Fibber McGee and Molly Show the exclusive rights to one OWI 
plug, an appeal for merchant seaman. On the day after the program, 
according to the War Shipping Administration, the responses doubled. 11 
Quinn and Fibber McGee and Molly were part of a very effective and 
efficient propaganda effort. In radio circles, the master schedule for this 
propaganda effort became known as the Network Allocation Plan. The 
plan was no secret and was, in fact, frequently discussed in the trade 
magazines. Yet largely unaware to the general public, American radio 
was organized into an extremely powerful propaganda medium. 




The Network Allocation Plan was the outcome of a very intimate 
collaboration between the Radio Division of the OFF, network executives, 
and radio advertisers. In the early months of 1942, they met repeatedly to 
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discuss how radio could contribute to America's war effort. If the first 
months of 1942 were any indication, the biggest fear was not radio's 
apathy but rather its overzealous and uncoordinated participation. The 
reason was that immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, radio 
writers and advertisers both on the national and local level seized the 
opportunity to exhibit their patriotism and tried to outdo each other in 
appeals for sacrifice and national unity. Moreover, what had been a 
trickle of government requests for air time before the war quickly turned 
into a flood of demands after December 7. In a first assessment of radio's 
war effort a little more than a month after the American entry into the 
war, the national advertisers criticized what they called "the present hit­
and-miss system" of radio's effort and openly wondered whether the over­
all effect of the time contributed was actually constructive. They espe­
cially objected to the incessant "plugging" of war messages and the 
"canned material" disseminated by government agencies. 12 
This was not the only criticism. In fact, the assessment of the advertis­
ers echoed the sentiment of the leading officials in the Radio Division of 
the OFF. After all, only a few months prior, William Lewis and Douglas 
Meservey had held leading positions in the CBS and NBC radio networks, 
respectively. Lewis became head of the Radio Division of the OFF in 
October 1941; Meservey was recruited as deputy chief one month later. 
They understood the challenges ahead of them as well as anybody else in 
the industry. In mid-December 1941, Meservey, in a departmental memo­
randum, summarized what had to be done. First of all, as he started out, it 
was important to remember that to the American listener "radio is pri­
marily an entertainment medium." Consequently, radio had a saturation 
point on informational and educational material. "The problem," as 
Meservey succinctly stated it, was "to make the best possible use of radio 
for the war effort while still maintaining the tremendous audience which 
[made] the medium so valuable." The radio industry was ready to do its 
part, but advertisers and writers needed "curbing as well as direction," as 
Meservey emphasized. The key words were selectivity, coordination, and 
allocation.1:i 
Lewis fully agreed with this assessment. When the leading officials in 
charge of radio at the OFF and at other government agencies met with 
representatives of the Association of National Advertisers on January 20, 
1942, Lewis presented Meservey's proposal for overall radio coordination. 
As he emphasized, the main problem facing radio was one "of skillfully 
superimposing the war effort on the existing structure," which needed the 
concerted collaboration of the government agencies and the entire radio 
industry. 14 
The radio industry concurred with this call for coordination. The Na­
tional Association of Broadcasters for its part had founded the Broadcast­
ers' Victory Council as the central liaison between the radio industry and 
the various government war agencies. The networks created the Network 
Relations Committee for the same purpose. The advertisers, finally, had 
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established the War Advertising Council to assess the new challenges 
coming in the wake of America's entry into war. Its Radio Advisory Com­
mittee was charged with handling the cooperation with the government's 
war effort through radio. 
The industry accepted the Radio Division of the OFF - and finally the 
OWI - as the central clearing station for their collaboration. The plan that 
coordinated radio's war effort, on the other hand, was conceived of by the 
Radio Advisory Committee of the Advertising Council. It was simple and 
yet effective. In essence, this plan asked the government agencies to pro­
vide every national advertiser with a definite schedule ofwar messages to 
be covered well ahead of time. It would then be left up to the writer or 
producer of the program to incorporate the government message in the 
most effective manner. Radio thus became one area of the intricate 
government-business cooperation that characterized most of America's 
war effort. 15 
The Network Allocation Plan was inaugurated on April 27, 1942. It 
dealt solely with sponsored shows carried over one of the three networks ­
NBC, CBS, and the Blue Network (later ABC). It asked the sponsors and 
advertisers of weekly programs to include a war message on every fourth 
show. Network programs which aired more than once a week, for exam­
ple, news broadcasts or soap operas, were asked to include OWI messages 
on a biweekly schedule. Secondly, the OWI drew up four-week plans to 
give sponsors and advertisers adequate time to prepare their shows. It 
selected three or four topics per week and emphasized them according to 
their respective importance. 16 The Tuesday night schedule for the first 
four weeks of the Network Allocation Schedule (April 27-May 24, 1942) 
is presented in Table 1. 
The Radio Division of the OWI, in connection with network representa­
tives and the War Advertising Council, prepared a similar schedule for 
daytime and nighttime radio for every day of the week. As Seymour 
Morris, the Chief of the Allocation Division of the Radio Division, rightly 
argued, it was "the largest advertising campaign that has ever been at­
tempted in this country." When Archibald MacLeish, the director of the 
OFF, informed Franklin D. Roosevelt about the radio collaboration, Mac­
Leish was equally enthusiastic: "I think the plan [Network Allocation 
Plan] offers potentially the most powerful weapon of communication on 
government information ever designed in any country."17 
As Clayton Koppes and Gregory Black have argued convincingly, Hol­
lywood and the movie industry became "a compliant part of the American 
war machine." Like radio, the film producers were eager to collaborate 
with the OWI and were an essential part in the government information 
and propaganda campaigns. Yet as I argue in this article, radio played an 
even more integral part in the OWI propaganda effort than did the mov­
ies, largely because 90 percent of the American people owned at least one 
radio set and on average had it tuned in for about four hours daily. During 
the war years, ninety million Americans went to the movies weekly. 
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Table 1. Radio Network Allocation Plan for Tuesday Night 
(April 27-May 24, 1942) 
First week (April 27-May 3, 1942) 
7:30 NBC-Red 8:00 CBS 9:00 Blue 10:00 CBS 
Burns & Allen Missing Heirs Jury Trials Glenn Miller 
(22.1 rating) (13.0 rating) (7.1 rating) (3.4 rating) 
War bonds Marines Need for nurses Scrap metal 
Second week (May 4-11, 1942) 
8:00 Blue 8:30 NBC 9:00 CBS 9:30 NBC 
Cugat Treasure Chest Duffy's Tavern Fibber McGee 
(3.3) (14.4) (6.4) (40.8) 
Sugar rationing War bonds Price control Sugar rationing 
Third week (May 11-17, 1942) 
7:00 Blue 7:30 CBS 9:00NBC 10:30 NBC 
Easy Aces Second Husband Battle of Sexes Red Skelton 
(6.1) (8.5) (15.3) (22.6) 
Price control Need for nurses War bonds USO 
Fourth week (May 18-24, 1942) 
6:15 CBS 8:00 NBC 8:30 CBS 10:00 NBC 
Voice ofBroadway Johnny Presents Bob Burns Bob Hope 
(3.7) (12.9) (16.7) (34.3) 
Car pooling War bonds War bonds U.S.O. 
Cooperative analysis of broadcasting ratings of April 1942, as given in the OWI 
outline. Obviously, these ratings changed over time, but presented general estimates 
of program popularity. The themes reflect the priorities of the OWI for the first four 
weeks after the inauguration of the Allocation Plan on April 27, 1942. 
Through the Radio Allocation Plan, the OWI messages reached the same 
number of people every day of the week. At least as important was that 
radio had become a part of everyday life and radio characters were as 
familiar to listeners as friends or neighbors. 18 
From May 15 through June 15, 1942, Variety collaborated with the 
OFF Radio Division in order to monitor the network allocations. Together 
they discovered that, despite some glitches, the Network Allocation Plan 
was catching on fast. Robert J. Landry, the editor of Variety who wrote the 
reports on "radio's showmanship," especially praised shows that inte­
grated allocated OWI messages into the plot rather than delivering 
straight messages. 19 
Landry and the OFF highlighted examples of shows that discussed or 
introduced war-related topics without missing a beat. The first Fibber 
McGee and Molly program under the Network Allocation Plan received 
wide attention as a model for other shows. The program was broadcast 
on May 5 under the title "Sugar Substitute" and was part of OFF's effort 
to register Americans for sugar rationing. In the episode, Fibber McGee 
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had set his mind on helping the government's drive by developing a 
chemical sugar substitute. As he explained his reasoning to Molly, "Hit­
ler got a substitute for everything." "Yes," retorted his wife, "And do you 
know that they'll soon need a substitute for Hitler."20 
Another show cited favorably was Easy Aces, a long-running comedy 
program of Goodman and Jane Ace that broadcast three times a week for 
fifteen minutes over the Blue Network. The comedy was largely built on 
Goodman playing the straight man for his dim-witted wife, Jane, who 
played the archetypal "Dumb Dora." In this particular show, Ace was 
discussing a new war organization called the USO, which he had just read 
about in the paper: 
AcE: I see here where they're starting a big campaign to raise 
thirty-two million dollars between May 11 and July 14 ... 
There's an organization [called] the U.S.O. 
JANE: U.S.A. you mean. 
AcE: No. U.S.O. 
JANE: Now wait a minute, dear ... don't start telling me 
they've changed the name of this country ... I know the U.S.A. 
as well as ... 
AcE: I'm talking about the U.S.O. 
JANE: United States of, and nothing else? 
AcE: It's not the United States ... 
JANE: Dear, don't let anybody hear you talk like that ... 
AcE: Like what ... I said U.S.O. 
JANE: U.S.A.... United States of America. You can't say 
United States of ... and leave it dangling there in the air ... 
Can't you admit when you made a mistake ... I won't tell 
anybody ... Dear! 
AcE: Seven, eight, nine, ten. 
JANE: What? 
AcE: Look, Jane, there's an organization known as the U.S.O. 
The United Service Organization ... it's a very important out­
fit ... It makes the leisure time the boys in the army have 
pleasant . . . and they even perform personal service for the 
men in the Army ... they give them movies ... radio entertain­
ment ... they entertain the men in the camps ... even on the 
firing lines. And they need money to carry on this wonderful 
work ... thirty-two million dollars to be exact. 21 
Whether its task was to familiarize Americans with new war organiza­
tion, to inform them about rationing measures, or simply to reinforce the 
general sacrifices that were necessary for the war effort, commercial ra­
dio was the primary medium to deliver to the American public these OWI 
messages. As Landry emphasized, the Allocation Plan and the Radio War 
Guide, which were published regularly to inform sponsors, writers, and 
--------------
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advertisers of the government messages to be covered, came as close to a 
"master morale plan" as the United States ever developed. 22 
Cooperation in the Network Allocation Plan was voluntary, but the 
Radio Bureau did not sit idly by when it found an agency or sponsor 
lacking in compliance. In the relatively few cases where this did happen, 
resistance was generally due to company presidents' dislike for the Roose­
velt administration and the OWL The staff of the Radio Division usually 
worked through the advertising agencies in order to coax radio sponsors 
into compliance. The staffers reminded the advertising agencies that the 
OWI had not curtailed radio, as feared by the industry, or they referred to 
the contributions and patriotic sacrifices of the sponsor's competitors. 
Most often, though, they used their connections and friendships to apply 
subtle pressure, as the following letter from Seymour Morris of the Alloca­
tion Division shows. In this instance, Morris wrote to a friend at Proctor 
and Gamble, a radio sponsor, and asked for his help with another program 
sponsor: 
Here is a little confidential matter which I would like to drop in 
your lap. Of all the agencies in the country, the one which is 
doing the poorest job for us on the Allocation Plan assignments 
is the Biow Company [Ginny Simms Show, NBC]. ... The situa­
tion was unfortunate enough when it was simply a case of 
doing a poor job for us on every message they delivered. . .. 
They now want to be excused altogether from any cooperation 
on this program.... Therefore, it occurred to me that you as an 
individual could be extremely helpful to us if - when a conve­
nient occasion arises - you could drop into Mr. Biow's ear a few 
of the opinions which your Company has about the Network 
Allocation Plan and the job it has done to date. 
A week after he had sent the letter, Seymour received assurance by 
W. M. Ramsey, general manager of Proctor and Gamble, that he would 
personally take care of the OWI's problem: "I should be very glad to take 
this matter up with him [Milton Biow] at the first convenient opportunity. 
I shall also consider the matter as off the record by destroying the letter 
as you suggest."23 
Seymour's request had to be off the record because the OWI had no 
authority to enforce the Allocation Plan. Yet for the most part, the Radio 
Division did not have to apply pressure in order to get compliance from 
radio sponsors and advertisers as well as radio talent. Actually, the radio 
industry's cooperation was as much based on self-interest as it was on 
patriotism. First of all, the voluntary collaboration of radio programs en­
sured that the government would not alter or disrupt commercial radio 
broadcasting. Secondly, as Quinn indicated and most advertising agencies 
and writers agreed, "when they use war themes and use them well, their 
Crossleys go up."24 And finally, as the army recruitment campaigns intensi­
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fied through 1942, making radio shows essential to the war effort provided 
an "insurance policy": it protected stars and writers from the draft and kept 
popular shows on the air - to the financial benefit of everybody involved. 
By August and September 1942, the draft had become the biggest 
concern of the entertainment industry, as the call went out to every able­
bodied man between the ages of eighteen and thirty-eight to serve his 
country. Of the twenty-five most popular radio stars, slightly more than 
half were of draft age:25 
Abbott and *Costello Jean Hersholt 

*Goodman Ace *Bob Hope 

Fred Allen Jim Jordan 

*Amos and Andy *Kay Kyser 

Jack Benny *Andre Kostelanetz 

Major Bowes *Harold J. Peary 

Bob Burns Edward G. Robinson 

George Burns *Lanny Ross 

Eddie Cantor [Kate Smith] 

*Bing Crosby *Red Skelton 





[*Indicates being of draft age.] 
It is true that a number of these stars had been asked not to enlist. It is 
probably also true that each of them, as well as less well-known entertain­
ers, were more valuable for the war effort on the radio than in battle 
fatigues. 
On the other hand, it was not difficult to look through the scheme of 
the War Advertising Council, whose head, Chet LaRoche, suggested to 
the OWI in August 1942 that the Radio Division was not using the com­
mercial programs enough. As Nat Wolff, the Hollywood representative of 
the Radio Division, argued, the advertisers were scared of losing their 
radio talent: 
Let's not kid ourselves about Chet La Roche suddenly practi ­
cally demanding that commercial radio be used more impor­
tantly by the government. 
Chet has already lost Ezra Stone of the Aldrich Family; 
Reber lanother advertiser] is worried about losing Crosby; Lord 
& Thomas [advertising agency] is just as worried about losing 
Hope as well as Kyser. And it is quite obvious that if we can use 
commercial programs more effectively by using more of their 
time, that the agencies will have very little trouble selling the 
ideas to their clients because the alternative is that they will 
lose their top stars altogether. 26 
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Therefore, while cooperation in the Network Allocation Plan was vol­
untary, wartime circumstances almost guaranteed full and swift collabo­
ration of the radio industry. The Radio Division of the OWI did not need 
legal jurisdiction to enforce the radio propaganda effort. As I argued 
before, the majority of shows participated willingly and eagerly, as radio 
sponsors and advertisers feared nothing more than bad publicity or to be 
deemed nonessential to the country's war effort. 
IV. 	 RADIO WARTIME PROPAGANDA: COMEDY, HUMOR, 
AND UNITY 
WILSON: And now, Ladies and Gentlemen, from Williams Field 
near Chandler, Arizona, we bring you a man who after a week 
under the blazing Arizona sun no longer looks like a frog belly 
in the moonlight ... Jack Benny! 
BENNY: Thank you, thank you ... Hmmm ... Frog belly in the 
moonlight? Jell-0 again. 	This is Jack Benny speaking. And, 
Don, although you put it rather crudely, there's no question 
about it ... I do look much better with my desert tan. 
WILSON: Yes, Jack, you certainly do. 
BENNY: Why not, I was outdoors all the time - horseback riding, 
swimming ... I tell you, Don, I feel like a million dollars ... I 
mean twenty-five thousand, yet I can feel like a million. [Loud 
Laughter]27 
Jack Benny was America's most liked tightwad and fall guy. Benny is, 
in fact, credited both by radio historians and fellow comedians for build­
ing the first radio comedy based on the idea of the fall guy. As comedian 
Fred Allen argued, "Practically all the comedy shows owe their structure 
to Benny's conceptions .... He was the first comedian in radio to realize 
you could get big laughs by ridiculing yourself instead of your stooges." 
Or as Benny himself put it more succinctly: "The minute I come on, even 
the most hen-pecked guy in the audience feels good."28 
At the time of the American entry into World War II, Benny's show 
already was a national institution. He started his radio program in 1932 
and, after five years on the air, he had become the most popular radio 
comedian. His trademark greeting, "Jell-0 again," quickly became part of 
everyday language, and his legendary stinginess turned all Scotsmen 
into his relatives. When a national magazine took a poll in 1944 to deter­
mine who had the best-known radio voice, Benny finished first, followed 
by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Bob Hope, and Bing Crosby.29 
Jack Benny was the best-developed radio character on the air. Equally 
well known was his radio "gang," the key members of which appeared 
with Benny for nearly two decades (on radio and, for the most part, televi­
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sion): Don Wilson, the big and jolly announcer; Phil Harris, bandleader, 
Southern playboy, and reputed drunkard; Dennis Day, the singer of the 
show, who also played the silly, polite, and stupid "kid;" Eddie Rochester, 
Benny's skeptical and, at times, disrespectful black valet and butler; and, 
finally, Mary Livingstone, Benny's wife in real life, who played a variety 
of roles. Other well-known features of the show included props like 
Benny's violin and the continuous joking about his poor playing, his vault 
in the basement of his house (where he hid his money), and his 1924­
model car, his beloved "Maxwell." On October 18, 1942, Maxwell became 
the first war casualty of the Jack Benny Show: 
WILSON: And now Ladies and Gentlemen, I have an important 

announcement to make ... Last Monday afternoon Jack Benny 

went to an official automobile graveyard in Los Angeles and 

contributed his famous Maxwell to the [War] Salvage Drive. 





WILSON: So at this time, folks, we would like to reenact for you 

all that took place on that historic occasion.... [Whole cast 

riding in Maxwell sound of an old car] 

BENNY: Oh, just imagine. Imagine turning a car like this into 

the junk pile. While the motor is in a wonderful condition. 





ROCHESTER: I lifted up the hood yesterday and the spark plugs 

were playing "Reel Down the Fan Belt." 

BENNY: That's a lie, because I'm wearing the fan belt ... You 

know, fellows, I realize I should give my car to the Salvage 





DENNIS: Did the laundry shrink your collar, Mr. Benny? 

BENNY: No! Pay attention! ... I'm sentimental. 

Benny's show was part of the October 1942 scrap-metal drive. Scrap 
metal, and especially steel, was one of the scarcest raw materials during 
World War II. The OPA hoped that five million of the thirty million tons of 
steel scrap needed to maintain steel production would be furnished 
through the recycling of old automobiles. Benny's Maxwell was the best­
known old car in the country, and the show was therefore ideally suited to 
carry the government appeal to the American people. 
As the show continued, Benny returned home with Rochester after 
delivering his car to the junkyard, but he was still mourning the loss of 
his dear "Maxie": 
BENNY: How can I sleep with my Maxwell all busted up in that 
junkyard I don't know. 
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ROCHESTER: Boss, why don't you look at it this way? ... Before 
you know it, the scrap from your car is gonna be part of a 
battleship ... or a tank ... or an airplane. 
BENNY: Gee. 
RocHESTER: I tell ya, boss, if everybody in the country turned in 
their old junky cars and dug up all the scrap they could, there 
wouldn't be no shortage of nothin' ... specially Victory. 
BENNY: You're right, Rochester . . . Absolutely right ... 
[Yawns] ... Well, goodnight ... No wonder I'm tired [Yawns] 
... Gee, I practically helped Henry Kaiser build a ship today ... 
Gosh, just think ... Little Maxie's gonna be a ship ... or a 
tank ... [Yawns]. 
The government had been conducting scrap-metal drives since early 
1942. As the Radio Division officials well understood, the danger was that 
the public would tire of repeated appeals for rationing and other drives. 
The periodic reports by the Special Service Division of the OWI Intelli­
gence Bureau showed that this was indeed the case. The Intelligence 
Bureau of the OWI was responsible for monitoring American public opin­
ion during the war, especially Americans' responses to the government 
propaganda campaigns. 
The Special Service Division undertook its first major radio-listening 
survey in December 1942 and showed that the radio war effort was gener­
ally well received by the public. Between December 1 and 5, 1942, the 
OWI investigators interviewed 518 people of a cross section of Philadel­
phia residents and conducted longer interviews with 45 additional people. 
Hand in hand with these interviews, a parallel group ofresearchers moni­
tored the four radio stations in the city over a two-week period to reveal 
the total number of war messages they broadcast. 30 
The monitoring report showed that approximately one-fifth of all radio 
time in the city was given to war-related material, which indicated that 
local programs were following their special Announcement Plan, which 
the OFF had modeled after and synchronized with the Network Allocation 
Plan. Like the Network Plan, the Local Allocation Plan asked that about 
every fourth local show should present a war message. Secondly, the inter­
views indicated that three-fourths of Philadelphia residents listened to 
the same or more radio programs than a year before, and 62 percent 
agreed that there was about the right amount of war-related shows on the 
air. The programs most disliked were radio serial stories about the war, 
war dramatizations, and some talks by government officials. Least criti­
cized, as the report emphasized, were special messages like asking people 
to save tin or to have their tires inspected in order to save rubber. One 
man's comment summarized the tenor of the report concerning war mes­
sages: "I think it [necessary contribution to the war effort] should be called 
to the public's attention a lot.... Some need an awful lot of prodding. I 
didn't save at first, and I think it was the radio that got me started."31 
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As the war wore on, however, listeners became less sympathetic to the 
"prodding" by government agencies. The OWI Intelligence Bureau learned 
this in a study conducted in December 1943, a year after the first one, in 
which 3,500 people nationwide were questioned about their opinion of 
radio's war effort. What the researchers found was that many listeners 
were fed up with war appeals but hesitated to make such an unpatriotic 
statement. Clearly, the war was one year older, and some appeals had been 
repeated hundreds of times during that year. In fact, 60 percent oflisteners 
disliked some specific appeals, including salvage drives. The criticisms of 
listeners were not always a reflection of the radio propaganda effort, but 
could reveal the poor execution of certain drives: half of the people tired of 
scrap drives, for example, argued that tin cans and waste paper were not 
collected anyway. 32 
More importantly, however, the study showed that listeners increas­
ingly viewed straight appeals as just another type ofcommercial. As the re­
searchers confirmed, a third to a half of the American people had a dislike 
for commercials. Straight government messages progressively met the 
same resistance by these listeners as did commercials and in fact increased 
listeners' impression that there were too many commercials on the air. As 
individual responses indicated, straight government messages between 
programs or at the beginning or end of radio shows were often tuned oup 
just like commercials; people simply did not listen to these fillers. Oie 
person expressed this sentiment both for himself as for other people he 
knew: "Lots ofpeople don't listen to the announcements between programs 
because they are fed up on [sic] silly, sentimental commercials."33 
Obviously, all radio comedy programs did resort to straight announce­
ments when their writers failed to come up with a funny way to inte­
grate the allocated OWI message. Yet for the majority of shows, Benny's 
writers did not lack ideas for integrating OWI themes, especially on 
rationing. Benny's renowned stinginess presented the ideal foil for dis­
cussing savings of any kind. Early in 1942, when the country went on 
"war saving time" and turned ahead the clocks in order to save electric­
ity, Benny was the first to use the "loss" of one hour to his advantage ­
by cutting his cast's pay.34 When the OPA announced a flurry of ration­
ing measures toward the end of 1942, Benny became just as easily the 
butt of the casts' jokes, as in the following program where they com­
mented on Jack's hospitality: 
WILSON: Well, Jack, gas isn't the only thing being rationed 
nowadays. 
JACK: No, there are a lot of things, Don ... A half pound of 
sugar a week . . . no whipped cream . . . one cup of coffee a 
day ... a meatless Tuesday ... But we'll just have to get used 
to it. 
MARY: Get used to it ... You've been rehearsing for this all 
your life.35 
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As some of the excerpts show, not all of the integrated OWI messages 
were ingenious works of radio comedy writing: some were flat, some were 
predictable, and some were uproariously funny - like radio comedy in 
general. What made them so very important for the OWI propaganda 
effort was that they provided a steady, well-dosed, and monitored stream 
of official reminders, government messages, and appeals for sacrifice to 
80 percent of the American people every single day. 
Moreover, these messages were delivered by comedians and entertain­
ers Americans had come to love. As Benny argued, the most important 
aspect of any comedian's success was whether the audience liked him or 
her: "In the first place, to become real successful they [the listeners] must 
like you very much on the stage. They must have a feeling like: 'Gee, I 
like this fella.'" After that, as he went on, everything else was secondary. 
A comedian could develop a character comedy, a situation comedy, or 
straight gag routine, as long as he/she was well liked and recognizable. 
Once this basis was established, listeners forgave comedians even for 
occasional bad shows.36 
Clearly the popularity of the comedy programs and the delivery of 
sugar-coated messages through humor and by likeable comedians was far 
preferable to straight propaganda programs. Yet I argue that at least one 
further element made the radio comedy programs of the 1940s particu­
larly suited for the execution of these propaganda campaigns. This was 
the comedy formula of the fall guy, which had become a dominant feature 
of radio comedy in the early 1940s. 
Undoubtedly, radio comedy in the 1940s contained a great variety of 
humor. Yet most important in the context of the war was the comedians' 
ability to unite the public behind America's war effort. While laughter 
and comedy can be contentious and even vindictive, wartime radio com­
edy overwhelmingly followed a different route: it provided laughter as a 
means for social cohesion and cross-cultural and cross-class harmony. 
John Morreall has best summarized this social function of humor: "Laugh­
ter is contagious, but in spreading from person to person, it has a cohesive 
effect. Laughing together unites people.... To laugh with another person 
for whatever reason, even if only at a piece of absurdity, is to get closer to 
that person.... Sharing humor is in this respect like sharing an enjoy­
able meal."37 
This cohesive role was the major function of radio comedy during 
World War II. People laughed with each other at home and they laughed 
with the live audiences, and listeners knew that there were millions of 
people tuned in to the same program just as they were. The likeable fall 
guy provided the ideal foil for exactly this kind of humor. This way, 
everybody could laugh at the same thing or the same person, knowing full 
well that the comedian could take it and, indeed, would certainly come 
back for more. At the same time, as in the example of Fibber McGee, 
listeners were subtly reminded of their own foolishness, yet without hav­
ing a finger pointed at themselves. 
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The fall guy was the creation of a medium apprehensive of public 
criticism and concerned about offending somebody - anybody. This radio 
comedy formula had developed in the 1930s and was in full bloom by 
1940. In comparison with today's comedy style, radio comedians in the 
1940s were very tame in their social criticism as well as their political 
satire. As Don Quinn remarked, "Any radio show with a rating of 0.01 or 
more will have enough trouble with pressure groups and self-appointed 
guardians of public morals without begging for more with offensive mate­
rial."38 Especially during World War II, comedy writers, entertainers, and 
sponsors were even more cautious not to attract bad publicity or to cross 
the OWI. What had developed as a successful protection for the sponsor in 
the early days ofradio by uniting the listening public against the fall guy 
was ideally suited as cohesive humor for wartime America. 
It is important to recognize, however, that while the smooth integra­
tion of government propaganda was the dominant trend, no comedy 
program abided by it exclusively. Comedy has to be critical in order to 
stay credible. Despite sponsor or OWI pressures, therefore, comedy writ­
ers did insert occasional critical and irreverent comments - for example, 
skits that reflected some of the disgruntlement of the American public 
with government wartime measures. One such policy was the prohibi­
tion of any weather reports during World War II. In the spring of 1942, 
when the military insisted on such a ban because of the widespread fear 
of Axis bomber attacks of American cities, the American public had been 
behind it. One year later, however, the ban was still in effect, even 
though the chances of Axis bomber attacks were virtually nil. Benny 
expressed the public ridicule of the ban when he quipped with Don 
Wilson about the prohibition of weather reports in a show in May 1943: 
JACK: Anyway, Don, here we are at Gardner Field [Califor­
nia] ... If I was in the Air Force, this is where I'd like to be 
stationed. I mean the climate is so cool and refreshing. 
WILSON: Cool? ... I stepped outside a few minutes ago and the 
thermometer said ­
JACK: Huh uh, Don, that's a military secret! 
WILSON: But these fellows in the audience are all soldiers, can't 
we tell them? 
JACK: No, no Don ... And stop perspiring, that's a clue.39 
Radio's master of political satire and irreverent wit was Fred Allen, 
who was the most censored comedian in radio during the 1930s and 
1940s. To be sure, Allen collaborated with the OWI to promote civilian 
cooperation with the salvage drives and rationing measures and was 
particularly effective in ridiculing hoarders and ration-book cheaters. Yet 
he also delivered some of the most stinging criticisms of government 
measures during World War II. In 1943, one of his radio characters, Mrs. 
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Nussbaum, explained the rationing system to her audience through a 
practical example - buying coffee: 
MRS. NussBAUM: You are pointing to the coffee grinder. 
ALLEN: Yes. 
MRS. N.: The grocer is pointing to an empty shelf. 
ALLEN: Yes. 
MRS. N.: You are pointing to your rationing book. 
ALLEN: And? 
MRS. N.: The grocer is pointing to the door. 
ALLEN: That's all there is to the point system? 
MRS. N.: You are getting the point.40 
While Allen's battles with network vice-presidents over censorship 
issues where legendary, all comedians and comedy writers routinely com­
plained about the petty restrictions they were working under. Every 
script had to be sent to the Continuity Acceptance Division of the net­
works, which checked the material for decency, possible offenses, and 
sponsor concerns. To start with, all swearwords, even relatively harmless 
ones like "darn," were out. Secondly, as Allen emphasized, when the 
scripts returned from the network censors, jokes had to be deleted because 
of "mention of competitive products and networks ... and political refer­
ences were banished lest they stir up somebody in Washington."41 
Writers therefore always considered it a great feat if they were able to 
outsmart the censors, even in what nowadays seem relatively minor is­
sues. Milt Josefsberg, one of Jack Benny's writers, recalls with great relish 
how their team of writers got around the NBC censors during World War 
II. Benny was performing for sailors at a Navy base and was showing off 
his knowledge of naval military history by listing naval heroes: 
JACK: ... and then of course there was Admiral Stephen Deca­
tur, who earned immortality when in the face of overwhelming 
enemy odds he uttered those fearless words, "Full speed ahead 
and 'oh fudge' to the torpedoes." 
MARY: Jack - in the middle of a battle, Stephen Decatur said, 
"Oh fudge to the torpedoes?" 
.JAcK: Well, Mary, he wanted to say something stronger but he 
couldn't because the Shore Patrol was standing next to him. 
As Josefsberg explained, the phrase "Damn the torpedoes" was well 
known, especially among sailors. By using the dainty "Oh fudge,'' Benny 
was playing on his slightly effeminate radio character and shared with 
the sailors a laugh at the censors' expense: the shore patrol was fair game 
for sailors' ridicule, as it frequently spoiled their fun; it fulfilled a similar 
role in the navy as network censors did in radio.42 
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V CONCLUSION 
As numerous writers on humor have asserted, comedy has to contain 
critical and at times biting commentary in order to stay credible with its 
audiences. While this element was further constrained during World War 
II, critical commentary remained one of the elements that endeared radio 
comedians to their audiences. This also highlights an important aspect of 
the cooperation between the OWI Radio Division and the radio industry. 
While the Network Allocation Plan provided the most important blue­
print for radio's propaganda effort, the OWI never completely controlled 
radio entertainment during the war. 
Overall, however, radio's domestic propaganda effort through enter­
tainment was an overwhelming success. OWI officials, broadcasters, and 
advertisers collaborated to organize radio into an effective propaganda 
vehicle while maintaining the regular broadcast schedule and without 
disrupting Americans' listening habits. Radio was indeed able to do it all: 
it continued to entertain its audiences and to sell products while simulta­
neously uniting Americans behind the war effort. 
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